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ABSTRACT 
We construct a stochastic game model of a legislature with an endogenously determined 
seniority system. We model the behavior of the legislators as well as their constituents in an infinitely 
repeated divide the dollar game. Each legislative session must make a decision on redistributional 
issues, modeled as a divide the dollar game. However, each session begins with a vote in which the 
legislators decide, by majority rule, whether or not to impose on themselves a seniority system. 
Legislative decisions on the redistributional issues are made by the Baron-Ferejohn rule: an agenda 
setter is selected by a random recognition rule (which in our model is a function of the seniority system 
selected), the agenda setter makes a proposal on redistributional issues, and the legislature then votes 
whether to accept or reject the agenda setters proposal. If the legislature rejects the proposal, another 
agenda setter is randomly selected, and the process is repeated. If the legislature accepts the proposal, 
the legislative session ends, and the voters in each legislative district vote whether to retain their 
legislator or throw it out of office. The voters' verdict determines the seniority structure of the next 
period legislature. We find a stationary equilibrium to the game having the property that the 
legislature imposes on itself a non trivial seniority syste1n, and that legislators are always reelected. 
1This paper was funded, in part by NSF Grant #SES-864348 to the California Institute of 
Technology. We thank Ken Shepsle for useful comments on an earlier draft. 
1. INTRODUCTION
Why do legislatures have seniority syste1ns? \i\'hy do incun1bent legislators tend to be reelected 
by wide margins? These are questions that have engaged legislative scholars for some time. 
On the issue of the incumbency advantagei there is a large empirical literature which has 
advanced a number of explanations for this effect. Jacobson [1983] gives a good review of this 
literature. The explanations range from the increased access of incumbents to money and the media 
(see eg., Mayhew [1974]), to the effects of gerrymandering (Jacobson [1983, pp. 13-15], Erikson [1972]), 
to the decline of the party system and consequent increased use of incumbency rather than party as a 
voting cue (Ferejohn [1977]), to constituency service and expertise built up by veteran legislators ( eg, 
Mayhew [1974], Fiorina [1977a, b]). 
Although the question of incu1nbency advantage and its relation to legislative organization 
have received considerable attention in the empirical literature on Congress, we know of no attempt to 
see if any of these explanations can be derived from a full equilibrium, dynamic model. All of the 
above explanations of the incumbency effect are non-dynamic, partial equilibrium explanations. In 
other words, it is not clear that all individuals, at all points in time are behaving rationally. For 
example, the explanations of the incumbency effect in terms of money and the media typically do not 
explain why it is that voters should be swayed repeatedly by advertising and campaign literature. The 
explanation based on gerryn1andering assumes that voters' behavior can be determined by certain 
socioeconomic characteristics of the voters, such as party identification, race, sex, income and religion. 
It ignores the possibility that both voters and candidates may have incentives to alter their behavior 
based on the new district characteristics. The explanation based on the decline of parties has no well 
worked out theory as to why voters should use cues such as party or incumbency in the first place. 
The explanation based on constituency service has some \Veaknesses when one considers the timing of 
voter and candidate decisions. For example, vvhy should voters vote for candidates who have done a 
lot for them in the past if the voters have already collected the rewards of the candidate's behavior? 
The above models are a rich source of ideasi and undoubtedly, some of the ideas could be made part of 
a consistent theory, in vvhich all participants are behaving rationally, and timing issues are dealt with 
explicitly. However, this has not yet been done.2 
2There have been partial attempts in this direction. Austen-Smith and Banks [1988] develop a 
full equilibriu1n model of voter and legislative behavior in a parliamentary system. However, their 
model is not dynamic since it deals with a one shot game. Kramer [1977], Baron and Ferejohn [1989] 
and Baron [1989] have developed dynamic models of policy formation and legislative organisation, but
these models are not full equilibrium since they do not explicitly consider voter and legislative 
interactions. 
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From our perspective, the most interesting observation in the above literature is that many of 
the above variables are determined endogenously by the legislature. It has been argued persuasively by 
Mayhew and Fiorina that Congress organizes itself to serve the reelection goals of its members. Thus, 
the franking privilege, the specialized com1nittee syste1n, the norm of reciprocity, etc., are all seen as 
ways in which Congress advances the reelection goals of its men1bers. Fiorina has taken this argument 
to its extreme in his thesis that big government is partially a result of the fact that Congressmen 
benefit from the increased opportuniuties to intervene in the bureaucracy on the behalf of their 
constituents. 
In this paper, we consider one particular aspect of legislative organization, namely the seniority 
system, and build a theoretical model connecting the seniority system with the reelection goals of the 
legislators: we formulate a full equilibrium, dynamic model of policy formation in a representative 
system in which a seniority system emerges endogenously.3 Our contribution is to develop a model in
which both voters and legislators are acting rationally both on and off the equilibrium path. Voters 
take into account the fact that their representive is only a me1nber of a legislative body and legislators 
realize that their actions will affect voters' behavior in subsequent elections. All agents take into 
account the dynamic effects of all of their actions. 
The approach we take to accon1plish the above objectives is to model the representative process 
as an L + n player stochastic game, \vhere L is the number of legislators, and n is the number of 
voters, partitioned into .£., distinct districts. The game alternates back and forth between the voter 
game and the legislative game. The voter game will consist of a game in which all the voters in each 
of the L legislative districts vote to deter1nine \Vho \vill be their representative for the next legislative 
session. The legislative game will consist of a game in which the legislators decide whether or not to 
have a seniority system for the current session and then proceed to select a policy. We will model the 
legislative game using the approach of Baron and Ferejohn [1989], who consider the legislative game as 
a form of a Rubinstein bargaining game: There is a random recognition rule, which depends on 
seniority, which determines the legislator \Vho makes a proposal. The legislators then vote, by majority 
rule, whether to accept or reject the proposal. The process continues until the legislature accepts a 
30n the issue of seniority, there has been remarkably little formal work in the political science 
literature. One exception is Shepsle [1990], who develops a model explaining the existence of seniority 
systems in the group provision of public or private goods. His explanation is based on a model of 
overlapping generations, in which agents need to have incentives to participate throughout their 
lifetime. This explanation does not depend on any characteristics of the group that are unique to 
legislative bodies, and hence is equally applicable to firms as to legislative bodies. Although there has 
not been a lot of work explicitly on seniority, there has been a substantial body of formal work looking 
at the role of specialized committees in legislative organization (for example, see Shepsle [1979] and
Gilligan and Krehbiel [ 1988]). 
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proposal, at \vhich time the legislature adjourns, and ne\v elections are held (i. e., \Ve return to the 
voter game). 
We sho\v that an equilibriun1 exists in which the legislature always votes to impose on itself a 
non trivial seniority system. In the proposal stage, the proposer selects a minimum winning coalition, 
retaining L2!1 for its own district and allocating ± to the districts of the remaining coalition members. 
Districts that are not part of the winning coalition get nothing. This proposal passes and the game 
proceeds to the voter game. Voters always reelect incumbents. The intuition behind the results is that 
voters, understanding the incentives in the legislative game, realize that their representative will be 
disadvantaged if it does not have seniority. 
These results contrast 'vith those found in most formal models of voting. Most formal voting 
models predict tied elections, with no incumbency effects. In our model the incumbent always wins by 
a unanimous margin. In addition, we have an endogenously chosen seniority system. These two 
phenomena are related to each other, in that the seniority system and the incumbency effect support 
each other in equilibrium. 
It is tempting to interpret the equilibriun1 of this model as a situation in which legislators 
blackmail voters to reelect the1n through the i1nposition of the seniority system. Ho,vever, note that 
that is not exactly what happens in the model. In our n1odel, the legislators cannot commit future 
legislatures to adopt a seniority system. The future legislature is free to vote against the seniority 
system if it is not in the interest of the legislators in that legislature to do so. What drives the 
incumbency effect in our model is the recognition by voters that self interested legislators with seniority 
will vote for a seniority system. If a sufficient nu1nber of the other legislators have seniority, then it is 
in the self interest of a district to make sure that its legislator does also, since the legislature will 
undoubtedly impose a seniority system. If all voters think this, it becomes a self fulfilling prophecy. 
2. THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK
Before introducing the model we \vork \Vith, we develop some general notation for stochastic 
games. Our model will be a special case of such a general model. 
Assu1ne that there is a set N of players, a set X of alternatives, and for each player i E N, a 
Von Neumann Morgenstern utility function ui: X _. 1R over the set of alternatives. We assume that X 
contains a null outcome, x0 with u;(x0) == 0 for all i E N. Let T be a finite set of states. We now 
define a stochastic game, r == {rt: tET} to be a collection of game elements rt== (S\11"\i/>t). Here gt 
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= IIi<NSf is an n tuple of pure strategy sets. Next rrt: st --> .Ab(T) = Ll.I
TI is a transition function 
specifying for each st E st a probability distribution, rrt(st) on T, which determines for each st E st
and y E T, the probability rr\st)(y) of proceeding to game element rY. Finally, ?j}: gt -+ X is an
outcome function which specifies for each st E st an outcome 1/;1(st) E x. We let s = ITuTst be the
collection of pure strategy n tuples, one for each game element. We write Ef = .Ab(SJ), where .Ab(Si) 
is the set of probability disributions over S}, and then define E; = f1
t<T
EJ to be the set of stationary 
strategies for player i. Elements of� are written in the form u = (u1, £T2, ... , un)· We also use the
abusive notation D"1(s1) = rri<N"l(slJ, and O"(s) = ITur"'(s') to represent the probability under O" of 
choosing the pure strategy profile s1 E S1, and s E S, respectively.
For stationary strategies, we can define the payoff function Mt: E --> Il'l" by 
00 
Mf(") =I: I: "�(D")(r)·u;(1f'("')), 
r=lrET 
where rr�(D")(r) is defined inductively by 
rrl(")(r) = rrt(D"1)(r) =I: "'(s')·rrt(st)(r), 
st est 
rr�(D")(r) = L 7r�_1(D")(y)·rr�("')(r),
y<Y 
and u;(1ft(0"1)) is defined by 
u;(1/;t(0"1)) = L 0"1(s1)·u;(1/;t(s1)).
s1<S1 
Thus Note that the above is only well defined if the sum in (2.1) converges for all O", t, and i.
(2.1) 
A strategy n-tuple, " E E is said to be a Nash equilibrium if M;("f, "-;) ::; M;(") for all
"f E E;. It follows from standard results of stochastic games, that if all the SY are finite and if there is
an absorbing state t E T with 1/;1(st) = x0 for all st E st, then (2.1) converges and there exists a
stationary equilbrium to the game r (See Sobel (1971]). Applying Bellman's optimality principle (eg. 
see Sobel, Theorem 3), it follows that any stationary Nash equilibrium can be characterized by a 
collection {vth<T <; n;i" of values for each game element rt, and a strategy profile," E E satisfying:
(a) For all t E T, O"t is a Nash equilibrium to the game with payoff function Gt: Et --> Il'l"
defined by: 
Gt( "t) 
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We will use the above result to characterize equilibria in the stochastic game we consider. Finally, it 
also follows from results in Sobel that a Nash equilibrium in the set of stationary strategies is also a 
Nash equilibrium in the larger class of non-stationary strategies. 
3. THE LEGISLATIVE SENIORITY GAME
We consider an infinitely repeated game between legislators and their constituents. The 
legislative game consists of three parts: a vote on the seniority structure, a proposal by a randomly 
selected member, and a vote on the proposal. The legislative session starts "\vi th a vote on the seniority 
structure. If a majority vote for a seniority system, it passes, otherwise there is no seniority system. 
Next, a random recognition rule, like that of Baron and Ferejohn [1989] is used to select a legislator as 
an agenda setter. If no seniority system was passed, all legislators have equal probability of being 
selected. On the other hand, if a seniority system "\Vas passed, then the probability of recognition is an 
increasing function of i's relative seniority. The agenda setter proposes a division of the dollar by 
legislative district. The legislature then votes on the proposal. If the proposal is defeated, a new 
agenda setter is selected and the ga1ne continues as before, except that in the second round and 
thereafter seniority is ignored in selecting the proposer.4 Once a proposal passes the legislature the 
legislative session ends. 
After each legislative session there is an election. The voters can choose to re-elect their 
incumbent legislator, in which case the legislator has seniority in the next session and receives a salary 
of c, or the voters can vote not to re-elect the incu1nbent, in which case their legislator receives no 
salary and goes to the next session 'vith no seniority. 'i\'hile this is not completely realistic it at least 
4It is important to note that in our formulation, the seniority system only matters on the 
initial proposal. An interesting variation to consider would be the case in wrhich seniority counts not 
only on the first proposal, but on all successive proposals as well. We believe that our formulation 
makes sense for two reasons. First, it captures an aspect of the way in which Congressional rules 
operate: namely, seniority is embodied in the com1nittee system, which gives higher than average 
influence to ranking committee members to specify the proposed legislation. But if a majority of the 
legislators oppose a committee proposal on the floor, then the committee effectively loses its power, and 
the proposal of the committee can be amended by the full legislature at will. Secondly, the solution of 
our model is equivalent to the solution of a inodel in 'vhich there is a status quo in which all districts 
get 1/ L, and the failure of a proposal leads to a reversion to the status quo. 
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captures the idea that voters can punish their representatives if they feel that they are not acting in 
their best interests. Our formulation allows more limited punishments than would be the case if voters 
could remove the legislator from office permanently. After each election the legislative game begins 
again with the new seniority structure.All agents have utility functions which are the discounted 
present value of their lifetime stream of utility. For the legislators, in each period, payoffs consist of a 
salary, which depends on whether they are re-relected, and a percentage (1 - B) of what they secure for 
their disrict. Thus, they skiin some exogenously given portion of their district's payoff. For the 
voters, in each period they get (} times their share of what their legislator is able to secure for the 
district. 
We now define the legislative seniority game more formally as a special kind of stochastic 
game. We let N = L U V, where L is the set of legislators, with L = ILi ::0: 3 odd, and V is the set of 
voters. We assume that X' = �.£., x {0,l}L, and X = X' U x0. Elements of X' are written in the 
L L form x = (z, q), where z = (zv ... , z .r,) E Z = L'> and q = (qv ... , q.r,) E Q = {0,1} . We assume
that there is a function <fa: V -+ L identifying the legislative districts, such that voter v is in legislator 
€;s district if <fa(v) = €. We assume that ne = l<P
-1(€)1 is odd for all € E L. We assume that utility
functions over X' are of the form u;(x) = (1 - B)z; + cq; for i E L, and u;(x) = (B/nq,(;)zq,(i) for i EV.
So Q = {O, 1} L repesents the seniority structure of the legislature, with typical element q =
(q1, ... , q,e)· Thus, qi= 1 indicates that legislator i has seniority, whereas qi = 0 indicates it does not 
have seniority. Let T = {O} U (Q x {0,1,2}) UL U (Z x {L, V}) be the set of states (of the system,
not of the union). Let 0 < 6 < 1 be a fixed discount rate, and q' be the element of Q satisfying q� =
1 for all i. We assume p: Q-> L'> L is strictly monotonic in each component: for all q E Q, and i E L,
qi > qf => Pi(q) > Pi(qf, 'Li), and that qi= qj => Pi(q) = Pj(q) . Thus, more seniority means a higher 
probability that a legislator is selected as the proposer, and legislators with the same seniority have 
equal probability of being selected. 
The strategy sets and transition functions for the ga1ne elements are defined as follows: 
For t =  0: 
For t E Q x {O}:
S� = { 0} if i E N,
"
t
(s
t
)(O) = 1, 
,P\s
t
) = x0 for all St E St.
Sf = {O} if i E N, 
t( t)( 
) 
- { 6 if y = (t 1> 1)
1T s y - 1 - 6 if y = o, 
Termination Game 
The Discounting Game 
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The above two games determine the termination conditions of the game. They are a formal 
way of introducing discounting into the model. It is assumed that there is a probability 1 - 6 of 
termination after each round of the game. Note that the entire game ter1ninates when this occurs. 
This is equivalent to assuming that players discount future payoffs by an amount 6. 
For t E Q x {l}: st = { {0,1} I {0} 
if i E L 
if i E N - L, 
rrt(st)(t1, 2) = 1 if EiEL sf > �,
rrt(st)(q*, 2) = 1 if EiEL sf ::; � ' 
,P\st) = Xo for all st E st.
The Seniority Game 
The first decision the legislature makes is whether or not to have seniority for the current 
session. The vote detern1ines if seniority is used in the Random Recognition Grune below. If a 
majority of the legislators vote for seniority, then the current seniority vector, t1, is used in the 
Rando1n Recognition Game. If there is not a strict inajority for, then the seniority vector q*, which 
assigns equal weight to all legislators, is used in the Random Recognition Game. 
For t E Q x {2}: Sf = {O} if i E N,
rrt(st)(y) = Py(t1) if y E L,
1/>t(st) = x0 for all s
t E St.
Random Recognition Game 
The Random Recognition Game is the second stage of the legislative session. In this game, t 1 
is a vector of dimension L indicating the seniority of each legislator. If seniority passed, the seniority 
vector t 1 from the Seniority Ga1ne is used. If seniority failed then q* is used for the seniority vector. 
A legislator is selected by a random recognition rule to niake a proposal for consideration by the 
legislature. This rule is similar to the Baron Ferejohn recognition rule, except we let the recognition 
rule be a function of seniority. Assumptions made above guarantee that higher seniority leads to 
higher probability of being selected. 
For t E L: t { z S; = {O} if i = t if i EN - {t}, The Proposal Game 
8 
rr1(s1)(sf, L) = 1, 
¢1(s1) = x0 for all s1 E S
t.
The Proposal Game is the third stage of the legislative session. In this game, the legislator 
who has been selected as the proposer in the Random Recognition Game makes a proposal for a 
division of the dollar between the legislative districts. If the legislator proposes the division z, then we 
proceed to the Legislative Voting Game (z, L). 
For t E Z x {L }: st _ { { 0, 1} if i E L I - {O} if i E v,
rr\s1)(t 1, V) = 1 if 
rr\s1)(q*,2) = 1 if
t .I, l;iEL S; > 2'
" t .I, 
"'iEL s; :::; 2' 
The Legislative Voting Game 
The Legislative Voting Game is the fourth stage of the legislative session. In this game, the 
proposal t 1 is before the legislature, and the legislators 1nust vote 'vhether to accept it or reject it. If 
the legislators vote to accept the proposal, the legislative session ends, and we proceed to the Voter 
Game. If the legislators reject the proposal, then we return to the Random Recognition Game, with 
the exception that seniority is ignored in selecting the proposer. 
For t E Z x {V}: st _ { { 0, 1} if i E V I - {O} if i E L,
rrt(s1)(q(st), 0) = 1,
,pt(st) = (t1, q(st)),
1 
0 
The Voter Game 
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and where 0 < B < 1 and 0 < c are constants. 
The Voter Game consists of a set of simultaneous elections in all of the legislative districts. In 
each legislative district, the voters of that district vote whether or not to reelect their legislator. In the 
version of the game as it is presented here, there is only one legislator in each district, and no 
challenger. So the effect of a negative vote in a given district is that the legislator from that district 
does not get a salary for the next period, and loses its seniority. 
This completes the description of the stochastic game. Note that there are no payoffs except in 
the voter game. At that point policy x = (ti, q(st)) is implemented. Thus, the pie is divided up
among the districts according to z = ti E b .t, and q(st) E Q determines which legislators get
reelected, and which do not. Given the utility functions we have specified, it follows that the output 
tie to district 
e is first divided up with Bt1e actually delivered to the voters, and (1 - B)tie being
skimmed off by legislator £. The voters each get an even share of the delivered output. The 
legislators, in addition to their share of the output get a salary which is dependent on whether they are 
reelected or not. 
4. RESULTS
PROPOSITION 1: The following is a stationary equilibrium to the legislative seniority game defined in 
section 2. 
For t E Q x {l}, and i E L:
For t E L: 
where n, = {wE{O, l}.t: 2:;w;=.ttl, w,=l}, 6, is the Dirac delta at x, and z,: n,-.n;i.t is defined by:
.t + 1 
2£ 
z,;(w) = { i 
if i = t 
if i i= t, w; = 1 
0 other\vise. 
For t E Z x {L }, and i E L:
For t E Z x { V}, and i E V:
t 
{
l if t1;2'. t 
""; (!) = . 1 o 1f t1; < I:
o-f(l) = 1 for all i. 
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REMARKS: The proposition gives equilibrium strategies for both the legislators and voters in the 
above stochastic game. In the seniority stage all legislators who have seniority vote in favor of the 
seniority system, those who do not have seniority vote against the seniority system. Since in 
equilibrium all legislators get reelected the seniority system always passes. 
In the proposal stage, the proposer will select a minimal winning coalition of legislators which 
includes itself. The proposer retains .£. 2'.£, 1 for its own district, leaving l to be allocated to the
districts of each of the remaining me1nbers of the coalition. Districts that are not a part of the winning 
coalition are allocated 0. Thus the proposer obtains a premium of .£. 2-l_t 1 l =.£. 2J,, 1 due to its
proposal power. As L-.oo the pren1iu1n goes to one half. 
In the voting stage of the legislative session, a legislator votes for a proposal if and only if the 
legislator receives at least i· Thus, if the proposer has proposed an equilibrium proposal, it will pass.
Finally, in the voting game, the voters always vote to reelect their legislators. It should be 
noted that although the proof shows only that this is a Nash equilibrium for the voters, in fact the 
strategy of voting for the incumbent is a dominant strategy for the voters in any given legislative 
district. 
The conclusions of the above model stand in sharp contrast to the results that come out of the 
traditional voting literature. l\rlost voting models predict tied elections, with no incumbency effects. 
Here, we obtain instead equilibrium behavior by the voters in ¥.1hich the incumbent wins by a large 
(unanimous) margin. The intuition behind the result is simple: The voters know that in equilibrium 
the seniority system will pass, hence it is in the voters' best interest to reelect the incumbent, since a 
senior legislator will be more easily able to serve the constituency than a junior legislator. Note that 
voters do not know that there will be a seniority system in the next session, but rather know that in 
the steady state equilibrium, seniority 'vill be voted in each session. 
PROOF OF THE PROPOSITION: We first specify the values, v\ associated with these strategies. 
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We then verify that for these values, conditions (a) and (b) are satisfied. For the following equations, 
_ L + 1 d _ 1 1 _ { . I{" . }I L} d a _ we set w1 - ---U:-' an w2 - I" Also, we define Z - zEZ. J EL. zj�w2 > 2 , an Z -
Z - Z1. Similarly, define Q1 = {qEQ: l{iEL: q;=l}I > fr}, and Q0 = Q - Q1•
The values of the games are defined below. To interpret these values go to the definitions of the 
individual games above. For example, for t E Q x {l} (see below) you are in the Seniority Game.
vf = v�t1"2) means that the value of the seniority game given that seniority has passed (t1 E Q1) is
.the value in the Random Recognition Game with seniority vector t1. If seniority does not pass (t1 E 
Q0) then the value of the game is given by the value in the Random Recognition Game with seniority
vector q*. Other values are defined in a similar way. 
For t E {O}: 
For t E Q x {O}:
For t E Q X {l}:
For t E Q x {2}:
vf = 0 for all i E N. 
t (q*.2) "f t  Qo vi =vi 1 1 E .
+ 6vf I 
where v:t' = v�q*,2) =I I 
{ l � 6[1:(1 - 0) + c] if i E L,
l [ O J if i E V.
For t E L: 
1 - 6 Lnqi(i) 
vf = (1 - O)w1 + c + 6vj
vf = � (1 - O)w2 + c + 6vj
t - 0 ' * V; - nqi(i )  
Wl + uV; 
if i EN. 
if i E V, 
if i = t, 
if i # t,
if qi(i) = t, 
For t E z1 x {L }:
For t E z0 x {L}:
For t E Z x { V}: 
vf = (1 - B)t1; + c +
vf = Btlql(i) + 8v[
t * vi= vi 
8v* I 
vf = (1 - B)t1; + c + 8v[
vf = -8-t + 8v*n¢(i) 1¢(i) I 
if ql(i) ¥- t,
if i E L, 
if i E V. 
if i E N. 
if i E L, 
if i E V. 
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The next step in the proof is to ver ify condition (b), which requires that for each game and each player 
the payoffs correspond to the values we have specif ied above. To do this we start with the definition of 
G, then using the definitions of the game elements and the equilibrium strategies show that the payoffs 
equal the appropriate values. 
For t E {O}: 
For t E Q x {O}: 
Gt(crt) =E 
t
[u(lj>t(st)) + 2:: irt(st)(y)vy] =a ycT 
For t E Q x {1 }: 
Gl(crt) = E 
t
[ui(l/>t(st)) + 2:: irt(st)(y)v;J 
O' ycT 
(ti,2).  . J., V; 1f i {1EL: tli = l}I > 2 
= 
{ v(q*,2) if l{iEL- t · -l}i < £,, I • li - - 2 
For t E Q X {2}: 
G\ut) = E t[u(,,Ut(ut)) + I:  ,,.t(ut)(y)vy] = u(x0) + I:  py(t1)vY.U yET yEL 
So, for i E L, 
= P;(t1)[(1 - B)w1 + c + ovtJ
+ I: Py(t1)[�(1 - B)w2 + c + 6vj] yd-{i} 
and for i E V, 
Fort E L: 
Gf(ut) = P¢;(i)(t1)vf
(il + I: . Py(t1)vT
yd-{</;(1)} 
= P.i.c·i(t1)[�w1 + 6vj] 'I' I </J(i) 
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But, since o-J(Z1) = 1, we have, for i E L,
G\,,-t) = E t[(l - B)sf + c + 6v*] = (1 - B)E t[sf] + c + 6v*,,- ,,-
But 
So 
Thus, 
and for i E V, 
For t E z1 x {L }: 
{ 
2-[Y]i (.t - 2)! 1 
(.t - 1)! '2-[.t 2 3lI 
{
(1 - B)w1 + c + 6v[ if i = t
� (1 - B)w2 + c + 6v[ if i # t
l n:(i)w2 + 6v[ if q\(i) # t
if i # t
Since t1 E z1, it follows that u'(I;iEL sf > �) = 1. So irt(,,-t)(t1,V) = 1. Hence,
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For t E zO x {L}: 
(1 - B)t1i + c + livi if i E L 
Btlqi(i) + livi if i E V
Since t1 E z0, it follows that u'(I:iEL sf ::; iJ, so rr\ut)(q*,2) = 1. Hence,
Gf(ut) = E t[u;(\bt(st)) + L rrt(st)(y)vi] (]' ytT 
= u(x0) + rrt(,,.t)(t1,V)v;ti,Vl + rr\ut)(q*,2)v�q*,2l
For t E Z x {V}: 
(q*,2) * t =vi =vi =vi.
uf(l) = 1 for all i. 
t = E t(u(t1, q(st))] + rrt(,,.t)(q(st), O)v
(q(s ),0)
O" 
= u(tv q*) + v(q*,o)= u(t1, q*) + /iv*
So, for i E L, 
and for i E V, 
t( t) B t 0 * t Gi " = n-- !�( · ) + vi =vi qi(i) 'I' I 
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We next verify that (a) is satisfied, that is, crt is a Nash equilibrium. For each game element we show 
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that no player can benefit from playing a different strategy. 
For t E Z x { V}: 
We want to show that ,,.t is a Nash equilibrium to the game with payoff function G', where 
uf(l) = 1 for all i E V. It suffices to show that for each i E V, uf is at least as good as any pure
strategy sf E Sf. So, 
Gt(,,.t) > G�(u� ,,.t.)I - I I' -I 
� E tlu;(l/>
t(st)) + 2: ,,.t(st)(y)vn
<T YfT 
;::: E 1 [
u;(¢\sj, s:;)) + 2: ,,.t(sj, s:;)(y)vnu_ i ycT 
for all sf E Sf. Writing l for the IVI component vector of ones, we can rewrite this inequality as
u;(¢1(l)) + 2: ,,.t(l)(y)vj' ;::: u;(¢1(sj, l _;)) + 2: ,,.t(sj, 1-;)(y)vrycT ycT 
But q(sj, l _;) ;::: l - c e• where e = q\(i), ,and c e is the e
th 
�tandard basis vector. Further, since 1- c e E 
1 , 1 (q(s;, 1 ;),l) (q(s;, 1 ;),2) Q , we have q(s;, l _;) E Q . So V; - - = v; - - . Hence the above inequality can be
written 
� [P;(%) - P;(q(sj, s_;))](w1 - �w2) ;::: 0
Now if nq\(i ) = W
1(q\(i))I > 1 (there is more than one voter in district i), then q0 = q(sj, l _;),so one
voter changing their vote does not affect the outcome. Hence the above expression equals 0, and it 
follows that u1 is a Nash equilibrium for G1. If nq\(i) = 1, (there is a single voter in district i) then
since uf(l) = 1, and sj :::; 1, it follows that%; = 1 and q;(sj, l _;) = sj :::; 1. In this case one voter
changing their vote changes the outcome. Hence, monotonicity of p implies that [P;(q0) - P;(q(sj, l _;))]
;::: O, and the last inequality holds if and only if 
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Since all terms in the last expression are positive, this inequality holds, and it follows that st is a Nash 
equilibrium for G1• What this demonstrates is that from the voter's point of view changing their vote 
either does not change the outcome or changes the outcome in a way which makes that voter worse off. 
For t E Q1 x {l}:
We want to show that O't is a Nash equilibrium to the game with payoff function G', where
<Tf(t 1;) = 1 for all i E L. It suffices to show that for each i E L, <Tf is at least as good as any pure
strategy sf E Sf. So,
<o> E t[u;(,P\s1)) + I: ir1(s1)(y)vj]a YfT 
� E t [u;(,P1(sj, s:;)) + I: ir1(sj, s:;)(y)vj].u_i ycT 
for all sj E Sf. Using "'f(t1;) = 1, this can be reduced to
Clearly, if ir1(sj, (t1)_;)(t10 2) = 1, legislator i is not pivotal and the above is an equality. So we
consider the case when legislator i is pivotal, ir\sj, (t1)_;)(t10 2) # 1. In this case, we must have I;jEL
t1j > i and sj + I::jcL-{i}tlj < i· So t1; = 1, and sj = 0. Thus, irt(sj, (t1)_;)(q*, 2) = 1, and the
above inequality can be rewritten 
(t1,2) v(q*,2)Vj � I 
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Now p;(t1) is the probability i is selected given that seniority is used and that .l,tl members
(including i) have seniority and .l,2l do not have seniority. The seniority assumption implies that, for
all q E Q, and iJ E L, qi > qf =? p/q) < p}qf, CJ..;), io;fj. That is, higher (lower) seniority for
legislator i means that every other legislator now has a lower (higher) probability of being selected as 
the proposer. Now begin at q* (assume every legislator has seniority) and remove seniority for ./,'./ 
legislators (not including i). At each step P; increases. Therefore, the last inequality is satisfied. 
Hence, o-t is a Nash equilibrium for Gt,. 
For t E Q0 x {1}:
As above, we have ; 
ot(.,.t) > at(u� .,.t.) I - I I' -I 
Clearly, if "t(si, (t1)-;)(q*,2) = 1, legislator i is not pivotal and the above is an equality. So we
consider the case when legislator i is pivotal, ,,.1(si, (t1)_;)(q*,2)) # 1. In this case, we must have
I:j<L t1j :'O � and si + I:j<L-{i} t1j > �- So t1; = 0, and sj = 1. Thus, "t(sj, t1_;)(t1, 2) = 1, and
the above inequality can be rewritten 
¢>(1 - O)[qjw1 + � I; q;w2] + c + ovr � (1 - O)[P;(t1)w1 + � L py(t1)w2] + c + 8vr
y< L-{i} Y< L-{i} 
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But p;(t1) is the probability i is selected given that seniority is used and that .tzl members have
seniority and .t2l (including i) do not have seniority. Using reasoning similar to that above, begin at
q* (assume no legislator has seniority) and add seniority for .t21 legislators (not including i). At each
step Pi decreases. Therefore, the last inequality is satisfied. Hence, ut is a Nash equilibrium for Gt. 
For t E Z1 x {L}:
We want to show that ,,.t is a Nash equilibrium to the game with payoff function G', where
t { 
1 if t1; :::: i u;(l)= 1 o if t1; < I·
for all i E L. It suffices to show that for each i E L, uf is at least as good as any pure strategy sf E 
Sf. So 
Gf ( u1) :::: Gf ( uf, u:;) 
¢; E t[u;('¢t(st)) + :L "t(st)(y)vner YET 
=::: E 1 [u;('¢1(sf, s:;)) + :L "1(sf, s:;)(y)vnO"_i ycT 
for all sf E Sf. Since t1 E Z1, l{jEL: t1j:::: w2}I > f· But uf(l) = 1 if t1;:::: i = w2• So, define r
E {O, l}.t by r; = 1 if t1; =::: w2, and r; = 0 if t1; < w2• Then u(r) = 1 and u_;(r.;) = 1. Since
I;i£Lri > f, rrt(r)(t1, V) = 1, and the above equation can be reduced to
Clearly, if rrt(sf, r_;)(t1,V) = 1, legislator i is not pivotal and the above is an equality. So we consider 
the case when legislator i is pivotal, rr\sj, r_;)(t1,V) i= 1. In this case, we must have I;j£Lrj > f and
sf+ I;j£L-{i}rj < f. So r; = 1, and sf = 0. Thus, rrt(sf, r_;)(q*, 2) = 1, and the above inequality can
be rewritten 
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But sf = 1 =;. t1; ::C: w2 = f. Hence, the above inequality holds, and we have shown that Gf(o.t)
;::: Gf(o-f, "�;),so ,,.t is a Nash equilibrium for Gt. 
For t E zO x {L}: 
Define r as above. Since t1 E z0, l{jEL: t1j > w2} 1 < !, we get �iELri < !' implying
.. 1(r)(q*, 2) = 1. Then arguing as above, 
Gf(,,-t) ;::: Gf(o-j, "�;) 
(q*,2) t(, )( V) Ct1.Vl t(, )( * 2) (q*,2) <:;>vi ;::: 7r si, r_i t1, vi + 7r si, r_i q , vi 
for all sf E Sf. Clearly, if '11"1(sf, r_;)(q*,2) = 1, legislator i is not pivotal and the above is an equality.
So we consider the case when legislator i is pivotal, '11"1(sj, r_;)(q*, 2) i= 1. In this case, we must have
I;jELrj < ! and sf + �jEL-{i}rj > !· So r; = 0, and sj = 1. Thus, 'li"t(s[, r_;)(t1,V) = 1, and the
above inequality can be rewritten 
V(q*,2) > (ti.VJ * > (1 O)t + 'v* t - vi {:::} vi - - li + c u 1 
But sf = 0 =;. t1; < w2 = f. Hence, the above inequality holds, and it follows that o-1 is a Nash
equilibrium for G1. 
For t E L: 
We want to show that o-1 is a Nash equilibrium to the game with payoff function G', where 
t _ l" 6 <Tt - 1n, 1L..wc!11 z1(w)' 
where n, = {w E{O, 1}.t: L;W;=.tt1, w,=1}, and z,: n,-.R.t is defined by:
.t+l if i =t2":t 
z1;(w) = { ± if i oj= l, W; = 1 
0 otherwise.
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for all i E L. It suffices to show that u£ is at least as good as any pure strategy sj E Sf. So For all st
E Si, 
¢> E t[ut(ib\st)) + L ,,.\st)(y)viJO' YET 
;::: E t [ut(ibt(st, s�t)) + L ,,.t(st, s�t)(y)viJu_i YET 
<o> ut(xo) + I� 1Lwcn I: ,,.
t(zt(w), Q _,)(y)vr
t t ycT 
;::: ut(xol + I: ,,.t(st, !! _,)(y)vrycT 
But now for all w, w' E n,, Ztt(w) = Ztt(w'). So, writing Ztt = Ztt(w) , then the above inequality
becomes 
(st,L) Vt 
0 �t,L) Now if sf E Z , which means that the proposal will not pass, then Vt vr. So the above
inequality becomes 
.t+l * 1 (1 - 8) 2":t + c ;::: (1 - o)vt = (1 - 8) I + c
¢> .t2:i 1 ;::: o ¢> .t :'.". i.
Since this inequality holds, .,.t is a Nash equilibrium for Gt in this case.
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On the other hand, if sf E z1, the proposal is one which will pass, then in order to have J{j E L: sfj>
w2}1 2: �, we must have sft ::; Sft· But then
_l_� )Zt(W),L) _
1n,1 w<llt t -
Hence, O"t is a Nash equilibrium for Gt. 
5. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
( t * ( ) , , * Csi,Ll 1 - &)stt + c + Dvt 2: 1 - g stt + c + uvt = vt .
We have developed a formal model of voter behavior and legislative decision making in which 
the seniority system and the incumbency effects en1erge as an equilibrium. There are a number of 
weaknesses in the above model. We have assu1ned an unrealistically simple model of the legislative 
session, and of how seniority plays a role. Na1nely, the legislative session is characterized by a random 
recognition voting game similar to the Baron Ferejohn model, and the only effect of seniority is to 
change the probability of recognition on the first round. Secondly, we assume that the only decision 
made by the legislature is a decision on the division of a fixed pie. We also assume that legislators 
preferences are a function of ho"\V inuch they get for their constituents, rather than just being a function 
of whether they are reelected. We hope to remedy so1ne of these weaknesses in the future. Despite 
these obvious weaknesses of the model, we feel that the inodel illustrates that it is possible to construct 
consistent formal models which connect legislative organization with reelectoral goals of legislators. 
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